**There are no universal a priori standards, only those defined by the boundary critique of the community to which the actor belongs.**
Bell (2004) exhaustively surveys the field of ethics as applied to Future Studies; a complete discussion of all the strands of ethical thought is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but to summarize, there are three major theories of contemporary normative ethics: (a) deontological ethics (based upon rules governing actions), (b) consequential ethics (emphasizing the consequences of actions), and (c) virtue ethics (emphasizing the effect of actions upon the moral character of the actor) (Hursthouse, 2013). These three branches are theories of ethics (ideas of the good and bad) in the sense that they are abstracted from a particular use in the exploration of the good and the bad. In this sense deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics are epistemological in nature; they all attempt to address the question of how we know what is good and what is bad prior to action.
**From a deontological standpoint** the actor knows that her actions are good or bad by making reference to a rule or rules. As May (2014) points out deontological ethics are not concerned with the consequences of taking action in accordance with set rules; good and bad are only referent to following the rules. Actions that have good consequences are bad if those actions violate a rule; for example, appropriating private property is generally considered to be morally wrong even though the property that is appropriated is food for starving children.
**To the consequentialist** it is only the effects of actions that make the actions good or bad. Consequentialist decision-making is a forward-looking process: the actor considers the likely consequences of her actions and then chooses the action that will have a good result. For example, a local government concerned with the amount of pollutants in the air might designate alternate no-drive days based upon the odd or even numbering of the license plate as a way to decrease the number of vehicles on the road, and thereby decreasing the level of emissions (as was done in Mexico City). However, when this regulation was adopted in Mexico City, many drivers bought a second used vehicle with a license plate number opposite that of their current vehicle. The older vehicles polluted more than the newer vehicles and as a result of the no-drive policy the level of air pollution in Mexico City increased dramatically. Regulating the days that an automobile can be driven logically would result in a good consequence, the reduction of exhaust pollutants; but in practice the fact that drivers avoid the regulation by purchasing a second older vehicle with a different license number resulted in an undesirable consequence, an net increase of exhaust emissions. A consequential analysis of the ethical question relies on a series of assumptions that are not necessarily accurate and accordingly cannot be said to be robust.
**If one practices virtue ethics** the actor engages in actions that are virtuous in and of themselves in that they are motivated by a virtuous trait, such as benevolence (Crisp, 2010). Accordingly an action is virtuous if performed by a virtuous person. A person is virtuous if she acts from a well-entrenched character trait that can be considered as virtuous (such as honesty or benevolence). Faced with a condition that requires a decision to be made based on the perception that a person or persons has an immediate need, the virtuous person acting from benevolence will attempt to fill that need (such as providing support to low income families with children). Ironically, as Folbre and Wolf (2013) argue, this well- motivated act can lead to serious fertility decline, ultimately undermining the welfare state itself.
**Anticipatory Systems** The nature of anticipatory systems as discussed in this paper is based upon the work of the mathematical biologist Robert Rosen (2012).
Rosen and those carrying on his work have persuasively argued that every system that can be categorized as living has within itself a **predictive model** of itself and its environment those predictions about the future can be used as a control device in the present.
Rosen defined an anticipatory system as: “A natural system that contains an internal predictive model of itself and of its environment, which allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions pertaining to a later instant” (as cited in Louie, 2010).
For example a deciduous tree contains an internal predictive model of the future and accordingly when days become shorter it will shed its leaves in anticipation of harsh weather conditions that occur in winter. The environmental event that caused the tree’s leaves to drop is the shortening of the daylight sun, an essentially benign phenomenon. The anticipation is that harsh weather will follow and dropping leaves will allow the tree to shed that part of their systems (the leaves) that are most sensitive to cold or dry conditions. Thus the present change of state of the system (the tree and its relationship with its leaves) depends upon a future contingency.
Similarly, Rosen’s (1991, 2012) notion of anticipatory systems is applicable to human systems; he explains that the human immune system is an anticipatory system that uses the predictive model of infection growing in the body in a future state to marshal the body’s defenses in the present for the purposes of engaging that future state.
The Rosen formulation of an anticipatory (predictive) system is opposite to those theories and models of living systems that have generally prevailed. Those systems Rosen has called **“reactive”** in the sense that the system itself does not cause its present state to change in anticipation of the future, but instead causes its present state to change in reaction to events occurring in the present or the past.
Contrasting the feedback 
loop is the feedforward loop, which Swan (2010) illustrates with the simple activity of an automatic watering system based upon the anticipation that the next day the lawn would be dry if it were not watered. In a reactive system a dry lawn would be watered; in an anticipatory system the lawn is automatically watered because it would become dry if it were not.
Rosen was a pioneer and as is generally the case with all those who break new ground his work has engendered fierce controversy (Chu & Ho, 2006, 2007; Louis, 2007; Wells, 2006).
**Feedback (reactive systems) and Feedforward (anticipatory systems) as Applied to Ethics.**
As discussed previously there are two aspects of ethics; the adjudicative aspect and the predictive aspect. In its adjudicative aspect any ethical system is a feedback loop: feedback is deemed negative when one’s utterances or actions are not considered to be socially normative, or deemed positive when they are. In the extreme of this situation, one might end up prison, whereas in the other case one might be promoted to a leadership role or held up as a positive model. The feedback function of any ethical system then is the adjudicative function. That function is usually (but not always) based upon a deontological system, and accordingly formal definitions of the good and the bad are used to adjudicate our utterances or our actions.
The remaining question raised by any consideration of ethics is what will we say or do in the future. At some point we will say or do something that will be subject to adjudication; however, this fact does not necessarily mean that we can predict our future actions by applying the same ethical approach as that applied by the adjudicatory function of any ethical system.
Indeed the fact that an **adjudicatory system** exists establishes that the anticipatory aspect of ethics is separate and distinct from the adjudicative function. Why else do we create and administer socially adjudicative systems if the predictive function of an ethical system is congruent with the adjudicative function?
**The Pragmatic Turn** Pragmatism has its origins in the 19th century thought of James, Pierce, Dewey, and Mead and the idea that the true function of philosophy is to enable us to act effectively. The core notion of early pragmatic thought is that all ideas, utterances, and actions can only be judged in relationship to our practices and the outcome of those ideas, utterances, and actions. This is contrasted to other ethical systems that are rule based (deontology), the effect upon the development of character (virtue), or the end result of our actions in an overall sense (consequentialist), none of which are concerned with the relationship that exists between our ideas, utterances, and actions and our practices (our values) over time. Pragmatism itself is not a methodology of adjudication or prediction. It is a methodology of identifying the results of ideas, utterances, and actions; it is a theory of meaning in that it attempts to clarify our thought. It is a theory of truth obtained by measuring the results of our thoughts against our practices and values and determining whether those results equated with our predictions
**The Linguistic Turn and Neo-Pragmatism** (the Pragmatism of Richard Rorty) The late 20th century saw a resurgence of interest in Pragmatism. The two primary manifestations of the revival in Pragmatism are a focus on the linguistic construction of philosophy, the linguistic turn; and a focus upon the contingent nature of our condition. As Dickstein (1998) comments: From this viewpoint, statements about the world or judgments of value are always provisional; constructions of language that belong to a particular context. Such arguments, like similar ones in legal interpretation, have drawn outrage from critics upholding a more stable or objective view of linguistic meaning and literary judgment. (p. 15)
The linguistic nature of late 20th century pragmatism can be best described as a refocus from the consideration of the results of utterances or acts to the justification of utterances or acts. The difference is subtle, but profound. Classical Pragmatism was primarily concerned with clarifying a hypothesis by testing the practical results of the work.
The original inquiry has matured in the late 20th century to an inquiry into the practical aspects of our utterances and actions, more to the point the linguistic justification of our utterances and actions in an environment in constant change. The Neo-Pragmatist view of the contingent nature of existence is core to understanding a deep suspicion of any statement that claims to be “true.”
From the pragmatist viewpoint our past or future acts are justified by our individual and collective values in relationship to the physical and social environments that we exist in.
Neo-Pragmatic thought is not concerned with **ontology** or **foundations**; indeed, from the viewpoint of Neo-Pragmatism, ontology is a notion that ought to have historical interest only, and foundations are unprivileged notions that can only be used to justify one action, at one time, to one audience.
**In Summary** We can say that Neo-Pragmatic ethics is the process of predicting our future conduct within a system that is contingent and without ontological foundation.
Rorty’s thought (much like Rosen’s) has been met with great controversy: “If one is known by the enemies one makes, then Richard Rorty is, indeed, a well-known man” (Brandom, 2000, p. xiv).
Rorty was a prolific thinker and writer; his views are global and controversy has surrounded all of his positions. Of particular relevance to the topic of this paper is his view that normative standards of speech and conduct are based within the specific community that the actor exists in.
In other words, **there are no universal a priori standards, only those defined by the boundary critique of the community to which the actor belongs** (Di Beradino, 2014; Rorty, 1989, 1991). The charge of **relativism** is that most often leveled against Rorty, and the one that engenders the most controversy (Miller, 2002). (Edmonds, 2007) also defended Rosen against the charge of relativism.